CSX's One Plan, which commenced on 6-21- 2004, may be CSX's last option to solve its various operations problems.

The Plan is the result of computer model simulations and scenarios. A six-month average of every train and car run on CSX's lines was analyzed to determine optimal routing and scheduling to try reducing delays and congestion.

CSX is proposing net leasing unprofitable line segments and creamskimming the profitable ones.

Rationalized lines not integrated into the ONE Plan would be considered as alternative routes until they are finally leased.

The computer analysis revealed more efficiencies by moving a car in one direction to the next terminal and sending it back on another line to a different terminal. It provided analysts with a matrix suggesting how trains should run, a schedule for train departures, and other operational directives.

CSX will now base its operations solely upon the simulation results to rectify the problems, with little or no deviation from the models. Consequently, the danger remains if a train has to be re-routed or is delayed in one terminal, then the ripple effects could possibly be felt systemwide.

CSX determined that its Louisville Yard will switch auto trains while its Cincinnati Queensgate Yard will classify manifest freights, thus decreasing the length of cars in the switching tracks and hopefully abating congestion.

By 9-2004, 45% of CSX's boxcars will be run through the Cincinnati yards.

The computer results showed where CSX was getting "bad" business. Small shippers that require more time to get the cars on site, then out to the railroad for pick up, and back to a switching yard to be put into a block for classification and transit to its final destination is not profitable.

Thus shippers may be charged up to $100 to have their car picked up and handled, although a receiver located on CSX's network may not receive the car due to time delays at the small shipper's location, even though it is easier for CSX

to handle. It is more profitable to give this car to the shipper within the network, and turn the car around twice rather than “mom and pop” the car. Small shippers should still get their cars, but they will be assessed a pricing premium.
An alternative for the shippers would be to instead truck the freight to CSX's network, and CSX would not require them to pay a premium price.
Conceivably shippers might just pay the additional expense since it's still cheaper than end-to-end trucking, pending the shippers' logistics calculations of using the two modes for segments of the trip.

CSX's grain unit will only be allowed 65 unit grain trains, and there will be no subdividing of those trains to give small farming operators 5 to 6 cars per week anymore. The Unit will stop leasing grain cars which congests their rail network; however as they sit out of service they consume yard resources. The grain unit will require small farming operators they must truck shipments to larger grain companies first.

Cargill Corp. is using their own employees to perform switching at their plant sites vs. using CSX employees.

Class 2 & 3 railroads will bring blocks of cars to CSX to take to their destinations.

CSX will handle the billing to the customer, and for simplification will give the short lines a flat “per car premium” for bringing the car into the network.

CSX says Class 2 & 3 companies don’t have the overhead costs that Class 1 companies have.

It is more efficient for CSX to pay the Class 2 & 3 companies to operate the "last mile" for a flat rate fee than for CSX to keep and lose money on the line segment.

Summary - CSX is creamskimming the long haul and unit trains, while mandating the last mile be spun off to Class 2 & 3 operators, force shippers to use intermodal transport to access CSX's network, or be denied rail access and service altogether.